A concern for individual differences has been missing from the Great Rationality Debate in cognitive science-the debate about how much irrationality to attribute to human cognition. There are individual differences in rational thinking that are less than perfectly correlated with individual differences in intelligence because intelligence and rationality occupy different conceptual locations in models of cognition. A tripartite extension of currently popular dual-process theories is presented in this chapter that illustrates how intelligence and rationality are theoretically separate concepts. The chapter concludes by showing how this tripartite model of mind, taken in the context of studies of individual differences, can help to resolve the Great Rationality Debate.
Introduction
In psychology and among the lay public alike, assessments of intelligence and tests of cognitive ability are taken to be the sine qua non of good thinking. Critics of these instruments often point out that IQ tests fail to assess many domains of psychological functioning that are essential. For example, many largely noncognitive domains such as socioemotional abilities, creativity (Smith & Ward, Chapter 23) , empathy, and interpersonal skills are almost entirely unassessed by tests of cognitive ability. However, even these common critiques of intelligence tests often contain the unstated assumption that although intelligence tests miss certain key noncognitive areas, they encompass most of what is important cognitively. In this chapter, I will challenge this tacit assumption by arguing that certain very important classes of individual diff erences in thinking are ignored if only intelligence-related variance is the focus. Many of these classes of individual diff erences that are missing from IQ tests are those relating to rational thought (Chater & Oaksford, Chapter 2). In this chapter, I will illustrate how a comprehensive assessment of individual diff erences in reasoning skills will necessitate the theoretical and empirical diff erentiation of the concepts of intelligence and rational thinking.
Th e discussion in this chapter will begin by showing how diff ering defi nitions of rationality frame what is known as the Great Rationality Debate in cognitive science. Th at debate concerns how much irrationality to attribute to human cognition. I will argue that a concern for individual diff erences has been missing from this debate because we failed to appreciate that there are individual diff erences in rational thought as well as intelligence. Th is is easier to appreciate when we realize that intelligence and rationality occupy somewhat diff erent conceptual locations within most models of cognition. Th us, I present a generic model of the mind that is an extension of currently popular dual-process theories (Evans, Chapter 8) , and I situate both intelligence and rationality within this model and show how they dissociate, both conceptually and empirically. 
Th e Concept of Rational Th ought in Cognitive Science and Philosophy
Th e term rationality has a strong and a weak sense. Th e strong sense of the term is the one used in cognitive science, and it will be the one used throughout this chapter. However, a weaker sense of the term has sometimes infl uenced-and hence confusedarguments in the so-called Great Rationality Debate in cognitive science. Th e infl uence of the weak sense of the term has also impeded investigation into individual diff erences in rational thought.
Dictionary defi nitions of rationality tend to be of the weak sort-often seeming quite lame and unspecifi c ("the state or quality of being in accord with reason"). Th e meaning of rationality in modern cognitive science (the strong sense) is, in contrast, much more specifi c and prescriptive than this. Th e weak defi nitions of rationality derive from a categorical notion of rationality tracing to Aristotle (humans as the only animals who base actions on reason). As de Sousa (2007) has pointed out, such a notion of rationality as "based on reason" has as its opposite not irrationality but arationality (outside the domain of reason). Aristotle's characterization is categorical-the behavior of entities is either based on thought or it is not. Animals are either rational or arational. In this conception, humans are rational, but other animals are not. Th ere is no room for individual diff erences in rational thinking among humans in this view.
In its stronger sense (the sense employed in most of cognitive science and in this chapter) rational thought is a normative notion (Chater & Oaksford, Chapter 2; Griffi ths, Tenenbaum, & Kemp, Chapter 3). Its opposite is irrationality, not arationality. Normative models of optimal judgment and decision making defi ne perfect rationality in the noncategorical view employed in cognitive science. Rationality (and irrationality) comes in degrees defi ned by the distance of the thought or behavior from the optimum defi ned by a normative model. De Sousa (2007) points out that the notion of rationality in Aristotle's sense cannot be normative, but in the strong sense of cognitive science, it is. Other animals may be arational, but only humans can be irrational. As de Sousa (2007) puts it, "if human beings can indeed be described as rational animals, it is precisely in virtue of the fact that humans, of all the animals, are the only ones capable of irrational thoughts and actions" (p. 7). Hurley and Nudds (2006) make a similar point when they argue that, for a strong sense of the term: "ironically, rationality requires the possibility that the animal might err. It can't be automatically right, no matter what it does . . . . when we say that an agent has acted rationally, we imply that it would have been a mistake in some sense to have acted in certain diff erent ways. It can't be the case that anything the agent might do would count as rational. Th is is normativity in a quite weak sense" (p. 2). Th e weak sense they are referring to is an Aristotelian (categorical) sense, and no cognitive scientist is using rationality in this sense when claiming that an experiment has demonstrated human irrationality.
When a cognitive scientist terms a behavior irrational, he or she means that the behavior departs from the optimum prescribed by a particular normative model. Th e scientist is not implying that no thought or reason was behind the behavior. Some of the hostility that has been engendered by experimental claims of human irrationality no doubt derive from a (perhaps tacit) infl uence of the Aristotelian view-the thought that cognitive psychologists are saying that certain people are somehow less than human when they are said to behave irrationally. But in using the strong sense of the term rationality, most cognitive scientists are saying no such thing. 1 Some of the heat in the Great Rationality Debate is no doubt caused by reactions to the term irrationality being applied to humans. As mentioned, lingering associations with the Aristotelian categorical view make charges of irrationality sound more cutting than they actually are when in the context of cognitive science research. When we fi nd a behavioral pattern that is less than optimally rational, we could easily say that it is "less than perfectly rational" rather than that it is irrational-with no loss of meaning. Perhaps if this had been the habit in the literature, the rationality debate in cognitive science would not have become so heated. Such an emphasis also highlights the theme of this chapter-that there are indeed individual diff erences in rational thought and that understanding the nature of these diff erences might have important theoretical implications.
Cognitive scientists recognize two types of rationality: epistemic and instrumental. Epistemic rationality concerns how well beliefs map onto the actual structure of the world. It is sometimes called theoretical rationality or evidential rationality (see OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF -FIRST-PROOF, 12/01/11, NEWGEN Audi, 1993 Audi, , 2001 Foley, 1987; Harman, 1995; Manktelow, 2004; Over, 2004) .
Th e simplest defi nition of instrumental rationality is as follows: behaving in the world so that you get exactly what you most want, given the resources (physical and mental) available to you. Somewhat more technically, we could characterize instrumental rationality as the optimization of the individual's goal fulfi llment. Economists and cognitive scientists have refi ned the notion of optimization of goal fulfi llment into the technical notion of expected utility. Th e model of rational judgment used by decision scientists (Chater & Oaksford, Chapter 2; LeBoeuf & Shafi r, Chapter 16) is one in which a person chooses options based on which option has the largest expected utility 2 (see Baron, 2008; Dawes, 1998; Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Wu, Zhang, & Gonzalez, 2004) . One of the fundamental advances in the history of modern decision science was the demonstration that if people's preferences follow certain patterns (the so-called axioms of choice-things like transitivity and freedom from certain kinds of context eff ects), then they are behaving as if they are maximizing utility; they are acting to get what they most want (Edwards, 1954; Gilboa, 2010; Jeff rey, 1983; Luce & Raiff a, 1957; Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) . Th is is what makes people's degrees of rationality measurable by the experimental methods of cognitive science. Although it is diffi cult to assess utility directly, it is much easier to assess whether one of the axioms of rational choice is being violated. Th is is much like our judgments at a sporting event, where, for example, it might be diffi cult to discern whether a quarterback has put the ball perfectly on the money, but it is not diffi cult at all to detect a bad throw.
In fact, in many domains of life this is often the case as well. It is often diffi cult to specify what the very best response might be, but performance errors are much easier to spot. Essayist Neil Postman (1988) has argued, for instance, that educators and other advocates of good thinking might adopt a stance more similar to that of physicians or attorneys. He points out that doctors would fi nd it hard to defi ne "perfect health" but, despite this, they are quite good at spotting disease. Likewise, lawyers are much better at spotting injustice and lack of citizenship than defi ning "perfect justice" or ideal citizenship. Postman argues that, like physicians and attorneys, educators might best focus on instances of poor thinking which are much easier to identify as opposed to trying to defi ne ideal thinking. Th e literature on the psychology of rationality has followed this logic in that the empirical literature has focused on identifying thinking errors, just as physicians focus on disease. Degrees of rationality can be assessed in terms of the number and severity of such cognitive biases that individuals display. Conversely, failure to display a cognitive bias becomes a measure of rational thought.
Th e Great Rationality Debate in Cognitive Science
A substantial research literature-one comprising literally hundreds of empirical studies conducted over several decades-has fi rmly established that people's responses sometimes deviate from the performance considered normative on many reasoning tasks. For example, people assess probabilities incorrectly, they test hypotheses ineffi ciently, they violate the axioms of utility theory, they do not properly calibrate degrees of belief, their choices are aff ected by irrelevant context, they ignore the alternative hypothesis when evaluating data, and they display numerous other information processing biases (Baron, 2008; Bazerman & Moore, 2008; Evans, 2007; Gilovich, Griffi n, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; Shafi r & LeBoeuf, 2002; Stanovich, 2009b Stanovich, , 2011 . Demonstrating that descriptive accounts of human behavior diverged from normative models was a main theme of the heuristics and biases research program inaugurated by Kahneman and Tversky in the early 1970s (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972 , 1973 Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) .
Researchers working in the heuristics and biases tradition tend to be so-called Meliorists (see Bishop & Trout, 2005; Doherty, 2003; Larrick, 2004; Stanovich, 1999 Stanovich, , 2004 . Th ey assume that human reasoning is not as good as it could be, and that thinking could be improved. Th e dictionary definition of meliorism is "the doctrine that the world tends to become better or may be made better by human eff ort." Th us, a Meliorist is one who feels that education and the provision of information could help make people more rational-could help them more effi ciently further their goals and to bring their beliefs more in line with the actual state of the world.
3 Stated this way, Meliorism seems to be an optimistic doctrine, and in one sense it is. But this optimistic part of the Meliorist message derives from the fact that Meliorists see a large gap between normative models of rational responding and descriptive models of what people actually do. Emphasizing the gap, of course, entails that on the distinction between rationalit y and intelligence OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF -FIRST-PROOF, 12/01/11, NEWGEN Meliorists will be attributing a good deal of irrationality to human cognition.
Over the last two decades, an alternative interpretation of the fi ndings from the heuristics and biases research program has been championed. Contributing to this alternative interpretation have been evolutionary psychologists, adaptationist modelers, and ecological theorists (Anderson, 1990; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer, 2007; Marewski, Gaissmaier, & Gigerenzer, 2010; Oaksford & Chater, 2007) . Th ey have reinterpreted the modal response in most of the classic heuristics and biases experiments as indicating an optimal information processing adaptation on the part of the subjects. It is argued by these investigators that the research in the heuristics and biases tradition has not demonstrated human irrationality at all. Th is group of theorists-who argue that an assumption of maximal human rationality is the proper default position to take-have been termed the Panglossians (Stanovich, 1999) . Th is position posits no diff erence between descriptive and normative models of performance because human performance is actually normative.
Th e contrasting positions of the Panglossians and Meliorists defi ne the diff ering poles in what has been termed the Great Rationality Debate in cognitive science-the debate about how much irrationality to attribute to human cognition. Th is debate has generated a very substantial literature of often heated arguments (Cohen, 1981; Doherty, 2003; Edwards & von Winterfeldt, 1986; Evans & Over, 1996 Gigerenzer, 1996; Jungermann, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1983 Koehler, 1996; Koehler & James, 2009 Krueger & Funder, 2004; Kuhberger, 2002; Lee, 2006; Samuels & Stich, 2004; Stanovich, 1999 Stanovich, , 2004 Stanovich, , 2010 Stanovich & West, 2000; Stein, 1996; Stich, 1990; Vranas, 2000) . Tetlock and Mellers (2002) have noted that "the debate over human rationality is a high-stakes controversy that mixes primordial political and psychological prejudices in combustible combinations" (p. 97). Th e great debate about human rationality is a "high-stakes controversy" because it involves nothing less than the models of human nature that underlie economics, moral philosophy, and the personal theories (folk theories) we use to understand the behavior of other humans. For example, a very infl uential part of the Panglossian camp is represented by the mainstream of the discipline of economics, which is notable for using strong rationality assumptions as fundamental tools.
Evolution Does Not Guarantee Human Rationality
An Aristotelian view of rationality has no room for individual diff erences in rational thinking between humans. In this view, humans are the unique animals who act based on reason. Th us, all humans are rational-and all are equally so. However, once we move from this view to the normative conception of rationality, we open up room for individual diff erences. Th e maximizing notions of rational thought and action in decision science potentially array individuals on a continuum based on the distance of their behavior from the normative model.
We might ask, however, whether-aside from holding an Aristotelian view-there is any other reason to be a Panglossian. One assumption that often draws people to a Panglossian view of human rationality is the thought that evolution would have guaranteed that our cognition is fully rational. Th is is a mistaken view. Th ere are a number of reasons why evolution would not be expected to guarantee perfect human rationality. One reason is that rationality is defi ned in terms of maximization (for example, in the case of instrumental rationality, maximizing the expected utility of actions). In contrast to maximization, natural selection works on a "better than" principle. As Dawkins puts it, "Natural selection chooses the better of present available alternatives . . . . Th e animal that results is not the most perfect design conceivable, nor is it merely good enough to scrape by. It is the product of a historical sequence of changes, each one of which represented, at best, the better of the alternatives that happened to be around at the time" (p. 46, 1982) . In short, the variation and selective retention logic of evolution "designs" (Dennett, 1995) for the reproductive advantage of one organism over the next, not for the optimality of any one characteristic (including rationality). It has been said that evolution should be described as the survival of the fi tter rather than as the survival of the fi ttest.
Evolution proceeds to increase the reproductive fi tness of genes, not to increase the rationality of humans (Stanovich, 2004; Stanovich & West, 2003) . Increases in fi tness do not always entail increases in rationality. Take, for example, the domain of beliefs. Beliefs need not always track the world with maximum accuracy in order for fi tness to increase (Stich, 1990) . Th us, evolution does not guarantee perfect epistemic rationality. For example, evolution might fail to select out epistemic mechanisms of high accuracy when they are costly Stich, 1990) It is likewise in the domain of goals and desires. As has become clear from recent research on the topic of aff ective forecasting, people are remarkably bad at making choices that make themselves happy (Gilbert, 2006; Kahneman et al., 2006; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005) . Th is should be no surprise. Th e reason we have pleasure circuits in our brains is to encourage us to do things (survive and reproduce, help kin) that propagate our genes. Th e pleasure centers were not designed to maximize the amount of time we are happy.
Th e instrumental rationality of humans is not guaranteed by evolution for two further reasons. First, many genetic goals that have been lodged in our brain no longer serve our ends because the environment has changed (Richerson & Boyd, 2005) . For example, thousands of years ago, humans needed as much fat as they could get in order to survive. More fat meant longer survival and because few humans survived beyond their reproductive years, longevity translated directly into more opportunities for gene replication. In short, our mechanisms for storing and utilizing energy evolved in times when fat preservation was effi cacious. Th ese mechanisms no longer serve the goals of people in our modern technological society where there is a McDonald's on practically every corner-the goals underlying these mechanisms have become detached from their evolutionary context. Finally, rational standards for assessing human behavior are social and cultural products that are preserved and stored independently of the genes. Th e development of probability theory, concepts of empiricism, logic, and scientifi c thinking throughout the centuries have provided humans with conceptual tools to aid in the formation and revision of belief and in their reasoning about action (Chater & Oaksford, Chapter 2; Griffi ths et al., Chapter 3; Dunbar & Klahr, Chapter 35). Th ey represent the cultural achievements that foster greater human rationality (Th agard & Nisbett, 1983) . As societies evolve, they produce more of the cultural tools of rationality and these tools become more widespread in the population. Th us, the cultural evolution of rational standards (Th agard & Nisbett, 1983 ) is apt to occur at a pace markedly faster than that of human evolution-providing ample opportunity for mental strategies of utility maximization to dissociate from local genetic fi tness maximization. In summary, a consideration of our evolutionary history should not lead one to a Panglossian view of human rationality.
A reconciliation of the views of the Panglossians and Meliorists is possible, however, if we take three scientifi c steps. First, we must consider data patterns long ignored in the heuristics and biases literatureindividual diff erences on rational thinking tasks. Second, we must understand the empirical patterns obtained through the lens of a modifi ed dual-process theory (Evans, Chapter 8) and of evolutionary theory. Th irdly, we much distinguish the concepts of rationality and intelligence in cognitive theory. Subsequent sections of this chapter develop each of these points.
Individual Diff erences in the Great Rationality Debate
Dozens of empirical studies have shown that there are few tasks in the heuristics and biases literature where all untutored laypersons give the same response. What has largely been ignored is thatalthough the average person in the classic heuristics and biases experiments might well display an overconfi dence eff ect, underutilize base rates, ignore P(D/~H), violate the axioms of utility theory, choose P and Q in the selection task, commit the conjunction fallacy, and so on-on each of these tasks, some people give the standard normative response (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff , 2007; Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Del Missier, Mantyla, & Bruine de Bruin, 2010; Dohmen et al., 2009; Finucane & Gullion, 2010; Frederick, 2005; Klaczynski, 2001; Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009; Stanovich & West, 1998b , 1998c , 2008b West et al., 2008) . What has been ignored in the Great Rationality Debate is individual diff erences. For example, in knowledge calibration studies, although the mean performance level of the entire sample may be represented by a calibration curve that indicates overconfi dence, almost always some on the distinction between rationalit y and intelligence OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF -FIRST-PROOF, 12/01/11, NEWGEN people do display near perfect calibration. Likewise, in probabilistic assessment, while the majority of subjects might well ignore the noncausal base-rate evidence, a minority of subjects often makes use of this information in exactly the way prescribed by Bayes' theorem. A few people even respond correctly on the notoriously diffi cult abstract selection task (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993; Stanovich & West, 1998a , 2008b .
In short, some people give the response traditionally considered normative, and others do not. Th ere is variability in responding on all of these tasks. So when Panglossians and heuristics and biases researchers argue about the normative appropriateness of a particular response, whoever eventually prevails in the dispute-both sides have been guilty of glossing over individual diff erences. In short, it is incorrect to imply that people uniformly display a particular rational or irrational response pattern. A particular experiment might instead be said to show that the average person, or perhaps the modal person, displays optimal or suboptimal thinking. Other people, often a minority to be sure, display the opposite style of thinking.
In light of these empirical data, it is puzzling that Panglossians would presumably accept the existence of individual diff erences in intelligence but not rationality. Th is is possible, however, if intelligence and rationality are two diff erent things conceptually. In the remainder of this chapter, I will show that the Panglossians are correct in one of their assumptions but incorrect in another. Conceptually, intelligence and rational thinking are indeed two diff erent things. But-contra Panglossian assumptions-the latter as well as the former displays substantial individual diff erences.
Discussions of intelligence often go off the rails at the very beginning by failing to set the concept within a general context of cognitive functioningthus inviting the default assumption that intelligence is the central feature of the mind. I will try to preclude this natural default by outlining a model of the mind and then placing intelligence within it. Th e generic models of the mind developed by cognitive scientists often give short shrift to a question that the public is intensely interested in: How and why do people diff er from each other in their thinking? In an attempt to answer that question, I am going to present a gross model of the mind that is true to modern cognitive science but that emphasizes individual diff erences in ways that are somewhat new. Th e model builds on a current consensus view of cognition termed dual-process theory (see Evans, Chapter 8, for a more detailed discussion).
From Dual-Process Th eory to a Tripartite Model of Mind
Th e idea that the brain is composed of many different subsystems (see Aunger & Curtis, 2008) has recurred in conceptualizations in many diff erent disciplines-from the society of minds view in artifi cial intelligence (Minsky, 1985) ; to Freudian analogies (Ainslie, 1982) ; to discussions of the concept of multiple selves in philosophy, economics, and decision science (Ainslie, 2001; Schelling, 1984) . In fact, the notion of many diff erent systems in the brain is by no means new. Plato (1945) argued that "we may call that part of the soul whereby it refl ects, rational; and the other, with which it feels hunger and thirst and is distracted by sexual passion and all the other desires, we will call irrational appetite, associated with pleasure in the replenishment of certain wants" (p. 137).
What is new, however, is that cognitive scientists are beginning to understand the biology and cognitive structure of these systems (Evans & Frankish, 2009 ; see Morrison & Knowlton, Chapter 6; Green & Dunbar, Chapter 7) and are beginning to posit some testable speculations about their evolutionary and experiential origins. I will build on the current consensus that the functioning of the brain can be characterized by two diff erent types of cognition having somewhat diff erent functions and diff erent strengths and weaknesses. Th ere is a wide variety of evidence that has converged on the conclusion that some type of dual-process notion is needed in a diverse set of specialty areas not limited to cognitive psychology, social psychology, naturalistic philosophy, decision theory, and clinical psychology (Evans, 2003 (Evans, , 2008 Frankish, 2004; Lieberman, 2007 Lieberman, , 2009 Schneider & Chein, 2003; Sloman, 1996 Sloman, , 2002 Smith & Decoster, 2000; Stanovich, 1999) . Evolutionary theorizing and neurophysiological work also have supported a dual-process conception (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005; Frank, Cohen, & Sanfey, 2009; Lieberman, 2009; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004; Prado & Noveck, 2007; Reber, 1993; Toates, 2005 Toates, , 2006 . In fact, a dual-process view was implicit within the early writings in the groundbreaking heuristics and biases research program. As Kahneman (2000) notes, "Tversky and I always thought of the heuristics and biases approach as a two-process theory" (p. 682).
Just how ubiquitous are dual-process models in psychology and related fi elds is illustrated in Evans, 1984 Evans, , 1989 . However, to attenuate the proliferation of nearly identical theories, I suggested the more generic terms System 1 and System 2 in a previous book (Stanovich, 1999) . Although these terms have become popular, there is an infelicitousness to the System 1/System 2 terminology. Such terminology seems to connote that the two processes in dualprocess theory map explicitly to two distinct brain systems. Th is is a stronger assumption than most theorists wish to make. Additionally, both Evans (2008 Evans ( , 2009 Chapter 8, this volume) and Stanovich (2004 Stanovich ( , 2011 have discussed how terms such as System 1 or heuristic system are really misnomers because they imply that what is being referred to is a singular system. In actuality, the term used should be plural because it refers to a set of systems in the brain that operate autonomously in response to their own triggering stimuli and are not under higher level cognitive control. I have suggested (Stanovich, 2004 ) the acronym TASS (standing for Th e Autonomous Set of Systems) to describe what is in actuality a heterogeneous set. Using the acronym TASS was a step forward in clearing up some of the confusion surrounding autonomous processes. For similar reasons, Evans (2008 Evans ( , 2009 , Chapter 8; see also Samuels, 2009 ) has suggested a terminology of Type 1 processing versus Type 2 processing. Th e Type 1/Type 2 terminology captures better than previous terminology that a dual-process theory is not necessarily a dual-system theory (see Evans, 2008 Evans, , 2009 , for an extensive discussion). For these reasons, I will rely most heavily on the Type 1/Type 2 terminology. An even earlier terminology due to Evans (1984 Evans ( , 1989 )-heuristic versus analytic processing-will also be employed on occasions when it is felicitous.
Th e defi ning feature of Type 1 processing is its autonomy-the execution of Type 1 processes is mandatory when their triggering stimuli are encountered, and they are not dependent on input from high-level control systems. Autonomous processes have other correlated features-their execution is rapid, they do not put a heavy load on central processing capacity, they tend to operate in parallel without interfering with themselves or with Type 2 processing-but these other correlated features are not defi ning. Autonomous processes would include behavioral regulation by the emotions; the encapsulated modules for solving specifi c adaptive problems that have been posited by evolutionary psychologists; processes of implicit learning; and the automatic fi ring of overlearned associations. Type 1 processes conjoin the properties of automaticity, quasi-modularity, and heuristic processing as these constructs have been variously discussed in cognitive science (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Carruthers, 2006; Coltheart, 1999; Evans, 2008 Evans, , 2009 Moors & De Houwer, 2006; Samuels, 2005 Samuels, , 2009 Shiff rin & Schneider, 1977; Sperber, 1994) .
It is important to emphasize that Type 1 processing is not limited to modular subprocesses that meet all of the classic Fodorian (1983) criteria. Type 1 processing encompasses processes of unconscious implicit learning and conditioning. Also, many rules, stimulus discriminations, and decision-making principles that have been practiced to automaticity (e.g., Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Shiff rin & Schneider, 1977) are processed in a Type 1 manner. Th is learned information can sometimes be just as much a threat to rational behavior as are evolutionary modules that fi re inappropriately in a modern environment. Rules learned to automaticity can be overgeneralized-they can autonomously trigger behavior when the situation is an exception to the class of events they are meant to cover (Arkes & Ayton, 1999; Hsee & Hastie, 2006) . Type 2 processing is nonautonomous. Type 2 processing contrasts with Type 1 processing on each of the correlated properties that defi ne the latter. It is relatively slow and computationally expensive. Many Type 1 processes can operate at once in parallel, but Type 2 processing is largely serial. Type 2 processing is often language based, but it is not necessarily so. One of the most critical functions of Type 2 processing is to override Type 1 processing. Th is is sometimes necessary because autonomous processing has heuristic qualities. It is designed to get the response into the right ballpark when solving a problem or making a decision, but it is not designed for the type of fi ne-grained analysis called for in situations of unusual importance (fi nancial decisions, fairness judgments, employment decisions, legal judgments, etc.). Heuristics depend on benign environments. In hostile environments, they can be costly (see Hilton, 2003; Over, 2000; Stanovich, 2004 Stanovich, , 2009b . A benign environment means one that contains useful (that is, diagnostic) cues that can be exploited by various heuristics (for example, aff ect-triggering cues, vivid and salient stimulus components, convenient and accurate anchors). Additionally, for an environment to be classifi ed as benign, it also must contain no other individuals who will adjust their behavior to exploit those relying only on heuristics. In contrast, a hostile environment for heuristics is one in which there are few cues that are usable by heuristic processes or there are misleading cues (Kahneman & Klein, 2009) . Another way that an environment can turn hostile for a heuristic processor is if other agents discern the simple cues that are being used and the other agents start to arrange the cues for their own advantage (for example, advertisements, or the deliberate design of supermarket fl oor space to maximize revenue).
All of the diff erent kinds of Type 1 processing (processes of emotional regulation, Darwinian modules, associative and implicit learning processes) can produce responses that are irrational in a particular context if not overridden. For example, often humans act as cognitive misers (see Stanovich, 2009b ) by engaging in attribute substitution (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002 )-the substitution of an easy-to-evaluate characteristic for a harder one, even if the easier one is less accurate. For example, the cognitive miser will substitute the less eff ortful attributes of vividness or aff ect for the more eff ortful retrieval of relevant facts (Kahneman, 2003; Li & Chapman, 2009; Slovic & Peters, 2006; Wang, 2009) . But when we are evaluating important risks-such as the risk of certain activities and environments for our children-we do not want to substitute vividness for careful thought about the situation. In such situations, we want to employ Type 2 override processing to block the attribute substitution of the cognitive miser.
To override Type 1 processing, Type 2 processing must display at least two related capabilities. One is the capability of interrupting Type 1 processing and suppressing its response tendencies. Type 2 processing thus involves inhibitory mechanisms of the type that have been the focus of work on executive functioning (Aron, 2008; Best, Miller, & Jones, 2009; Hasher, Lustig, & Zacks, 2007; Miyake et al., 2000; Zelazo, 2004) . But the ability to suppress Type 1 processing gets the job only half done. Suppressing one response is not helpful unless there is a better response available to substitute for it. Where do these better responses come from? One answer is that they come from processes of hypothetical reasoning and cognitive simulation that are a unique aspect of Type 2 processing (JohnsonLaird, Chapter 9). When we reason hypothetically, we create temporary models of the world and test out actions (or alternative causes) in that simulated world. To reason hypothetically we must, however, have one critical cognitive capability-we must be able to prevent our representations of the real world from becoming confused with representations of imaginary situations. Th e so-called cognitive decoupling operations are the central feature of Type 2 processing that make this possible, and they have implications for how we conceptualize both intelligence and rationality.
In a much-cited article, Leslie (1987) modeled pretense by positing a so-called secondary representation (see Perner, 1991) that was a copy of the primary representation but that was decoupled from the world so that it could be manipulated-that is, be a mechanism for simulation. Th e important issue for our purposes is that decoupling secondary representations from the world and then maintaining the decoupling while simulation is carried out is a Type 2 processing operation. It is computationally taxing and greatly restricts the ability to conduct any other Type 2 operation simultaneously. In fact, decoupling operations might well be a major contributor to a distinctive Type 2 property: its seriality. Figure 22 .1 represents a preliminary model of mind, based on what has been outlined thus far, with one important addition. Th e addition stems from the fact that instructions to initiate override of Type 1 processing (and to initiate simulation activities) must be controlled by cognitive machinery at a higher level than the decoupling machinery itself. Type 2 processing needs to be understood in terms of two levels of cognitive control-what are termed in Figure 22 .1 the algorithmic level and the refl ective level. Th ere I have presented the tripartite proposal in the spirit of Dan Dennett's (1996) book Kinds of Minds where he used that title to suggest that within the brain of humans are control systems of very diff erent types-diff erent kinds of minds. I have labeled the traditional source of Type 1 processing as the autonomous mind but diff erentiated Type 2 processing into the algorithmic mind and the refl ective mind. Th e autonomous mind can be overridden by algorithmic-level mechanisms; but override itself is initiated by higher level control. Th at is, the algorithmic level is conceptualized as subordinate to the higher level goal states and epistemic thinking dispositions of the refl ective mind.
Individual Diff erences Within the Tripartite Model of Mind
Psychometricians have long distinguished typical performance situations from optimal (sometimes termed maximal) performance situations (see Ackerman, 1994 Ackerman, , 1996 Ackerman & Heggestad, on the distinction between rationalit y and intelligence OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF -FIRST-PROOF, 12/01/11, NEWGEN 1997; Ackerman & Kanfer, 2004 ; see also Cronbach, 1949; Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002; Sternberg, Grigorenko, & Zhang, 2008) . Typical performance situations are unconstrained in that no overt instructions to maximize performance are given, and the task interpretation is determined to some extent by the participant. Th e goals to be pursued in the task are left somewhat open. Th e issue is what a person would typically do in such a situation, given few constraints. Typical performance measures are measures of the refl ective mind-they assess in part goal prioritization and epistemic regulation. In contrast, optimal performance situations are those where the task interpretation is determined externally. Th e person performing the task is instructed to maximize performance. Th us, optimal performance measures examine questions of the effi ciency of goal pursuit-they capture the processing effi ciency of the algorithmic mind. All tests of intelligence or cognitive aptitude are optimal performance assessments, whereas measures of critical or rational thinking are often assessed under typical performance conditions. Th e diff erence between the algorithmic mind and the refl ective mind is captured in another wellestablished distinction in the measurement of individual diff erences: the distinction between cognitive ability and thinking dispositions. Th e former are, as just mentioned, measures of the effi ciency of the algorithmic mind. Th e latter travel under a variety of names in psychology-thinking dispositions or cognitive styles being the two most popular. Many thinking dispositions concern beliefs, belief structure and, importantly, attitudes toward forming and changing beliefs. Other thinking dispositions that have been identifi ed concern a person's goals and goal hierarchy. Examples of some thinking dispositions that have been investigated by psychologists are actively open-minded thinking, need for cognition (the tendency to think a lot), consideration of future consequences, need for closure, superstitious thinking, and dogmatism (Cacioppo et al., 1996; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Norris & Ennis, 1989; Schommer-Aikins, 2004; Stanovich, 1999 Stanovich, , 2009b Sternberg, 2003; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1997; Strathman et al., 1994) .
Th e types of cognitive propensities that these thinking disposition measures refl ect are the tendency to collect information before making up one's mind, the tendency to seek various points of view before coming to a conclusion, the disposition to think extensively about a problem before responding, the tendency to calibrate the degree of strength of one's opinion to the degree of evidence available, the tendency to think about future consequences before taking action, the tendency to explicitly weigh pluses (Stanovich, 2002 (Stanovich, , 2009b . Figure 22 .1 represents the classifi cation of individual diff erences in the tripartite view. Th e broken horizontal line represents the location of the key distinction in older, dual-process views. Whereas the refl ective and algorithmic minds are characterized by continuous individual diff erences and substantial variability, there are fewer continuous individual diff erences in the autonomous mind and less variability (see Kaufman et al., 2010 , for a diff erent view). Disruptions to the autonomous mind often refl ect damage to cognitive modules that result in very discontinuous cognitive dysfunction such as autism or the agnosias and alexias (Anderson, 2005; Bermudez, 2001; Murphy & Stich, 2000) . Figure 22 .1 identifi es variation in fl uid intelligence (Gf ) with individual diff erences in the efficiency of processing of the algorithmic mind. Fluid intelligence is one component in the Cattell/Horn/ Carroll (CHC) theory of intelligence (Carroll, 1993; Cattell, 1963 Cattell, , 1998 Horn & Cattell, 1967) . Sometimes called the theory of fl uid and crystallized intelligence (symbolized Gf/Gc theory), this theory posits that tests of mental ability tap, in addition to a general factor, a small number of broad factors, of which two are dominant (Geary, 2005; Horn & Noll, 1997; Taub & McGrew, 2004) . Fluid intelligence (Gf ) refl ects reasoning abilities operating across a variety of domains-in particular, novel ones. It is measured by tasks of abstract reasoning such as fi gural analogies, Raven matrices, and series completion. Crystallized intelligence (Gc) refl ects declarative knowledge acquired from acculturated learning experiences. It is measured by vocabulary tasks, verbal comprehension, and general knowledge measures. Ackerman (1996) discusses how the two dominant factors in the CHC theory refl ect a long history of considering two aspects of intelligence: intelligence-as-process (Gf ) and intelligenceas-knowledge (Gc).
I have argued that individual diff erences in fl uid intelligence are a key indicator of the variability across individuals in the ability to sustain decoupling operations (Stanovich, 2001 (Stanovich, , 2009b . Increasingly it is becoming apparent that one of the critical mental operations being tapped by measures of fl uid intelligence is the cognitive decoupling operation I have discussed in this chapter. Th is is becoming clear from converging work on executive function and working memory. Most measures of executive function and working memory are direct or indirect indicators of a person's ability to sustain decoupling operations (Duncan et al., 2008; Engle, 2002; Gray, Chabris, & Braver, 2003; Hasher, Lustig, & Zacks, 2007; Kane, 2003; Lepine, Barrouillet, & Camos, 2005; Salthouse, Atkinson, & Berish, 2003; Salthouse & Pink, 2008; Stanovich, 2011) . Figure 22 .1 highlights an important sense in which rationality is a more encompassing construct than intelligence. As previously discussed, to be rational, a person must have well-calibrated beliefs and must act appropriately on those beliefs to achieve goals-both properties of the refl ective mind. Th e person must, of course, have the algorithmic-level machinery that enables him or her to carry out the actions and to process the environment in a way that enables the correct beliefs to be fi xed and the correct actions to be taken. Th us, individual diff erences in rational thought and action can arise because of individual diff erences in fl uid intelligence (the algorithmic mind) or because of individual diff erences in thinking dispositions (the refl ective mind).
Th e conceptualization in Figure 22 .1 has several advantages. First, it conceptualizes intelligence in terms of what intelligence tests actually measure. IQ tests do not attempt to measure directly an aspect of epistemic or instrumental rationality, nor do they examine any thinking dispositions that relate to rationality. It is also clear from Figure 22 .1 why rationality and intelligence can become dissociated. Rational thinking depends on thinking dispositions on the distinction between rationalit y and intelligence OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF -FIRST-PROOF, 12/01/11, NEWGEN as well as algorithmic effi ciency. Th us, as long as variation in thinking dispositions is not perfectly correlated with fl uid intelligence, there is the statistical possibility of dissociations between rationality and intelligence.
In fact, substantial empirical evidence indicates that individual diff erences in thinking dispositions and intelligence are far from perfectly correlated. Many diff erent studies involving thousands of subjects (e.g., Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Austin & Deary, 2002; Baron, 1982; Bates & Shieles, 2003; Cacioppo et al., 1996; Eysenck, 1994; Goff & Ackerman, 1992; Kanazawa, 2004; Kokis et al., 2002; Zeidner & Matthews, 2000) have indicated that measures of intelligence display only moderate to weak correlations (usually less than .30) with some thinking dispositions (e.g., actively openminded thinking, need for cognition) and near-zero correlations with others (e.g., conscientiousness, curiosity, diligence). Other important evidence supports the conceptual distinction made here between algorithmic cognitive capacity and thinking dispositions. For example, across a variety of tasks from the heuristics and biases literature, it has consistently been found that rational thinking dispositions will predict variance after the eff ects of general intelligence have been controlled. 4 Th e functions of the diff erent levels of control are illustrated more completely in Figure 22 .2. Th ere, it is clear that the override capacity itself is a property of the algorithmic mind and it is indicated by the arrow labeled A. However, previous dual-process theories have tended to ignore the higher level cognitive function that initiates the override function in the fi rst place. Th is is a dispositional property of the refl ective mind that is related to rationality. In the model in Figure 22 .2, it corresponds to arrow B, which represents (in machine intelligence terms) the call to the algorithmic mind to override the Type 1 response by taking it offl ine. Th is is a diff erent mental function than the override function itself (arrow A), and there, the evidence cited earlier indicates that the two functions are indexed by diff erent types of individual diff erences. Figure 22 .2 represents another aspect of cognition somewhat neglected by previous dual-process theories. Specifi cally, the override function has loomed large in dual-process theory but less so the simulation process that computes the alternative response that makes the override worthwhile. Figure  22 .2 explicitly represents the simulation function as well as the fact that the call to initiate simulation originates in the refl ective mind. Th e decoupling OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF -FIRST-PROOF, 12/01/11, NEWGEN operation (indicated by arrow C) itself is carried out by the algorithmic mind and the call to initiate simulation (indicated by arrow D) by the refl ective mind. Again, two diff erent types of individual diff erences are associated with the initiation call and the decoupling operator-specifi cally, rational thinking dispositions with the former and fl uid intelligence with the latter. Also represented is the fact that the higher levels of control receive inputs from the computations of the autonomous mind (arrow G) via so-called preattentive processes (Evans, 2006 (Evans, , 2007 (Evans, , 2008 (Evans, , 2009 . Th e arrows labeled E and F refl ect the decoupling and higher level control of a kind of Type 2 processing (serial associative cognition) that does not involve fully explicit cognitive simulation (see Stanovich, 2011) .
Mindware in the Tripartite Model
Knowledge bases, both innate and derived from experience, also importantly bear on rationality. Th e term mindware was coined by Perkins (1995) to refer to the rules, knowledge, procedures, and strategies that a person can retrieve from memory in order to aid decision making and problem solving. Each of the levels in the tripartite model of mind has to access knowledge to carry out its operations, as illustrated in Figure 22 .3. As the Figure indi cates, the refl ective mind not only accesses general knowledge structures (Gc) but, importantly, accesses the person's opinions, beliefs, and refl ectively acquired goal structure. Th e algorithmic mind accesses microstrategies for cognitive operations and production system rules for sequencing behaviors and thoughts. Finally, the autonomous mind accesses not only knowledge bases that are evolutionary adaptations, but it also retrieves information that has become tightly compiled and available to the autonomous mind due to overlearning and practice.
It is important to note that what is displayed in Figure 22 .3 are the knowledge bases that are unique to each mind. Algorithmic-and refl ective-level processes also receive inputs from the computations of the autonomous mind (see arrow G in Figure 22 .2). Th e mindware available for retrieval, particularly that available to the refl ective mind, is in part the product of past learning experiences. Th e knowledge structures available for retrieval by the refl ective mind represent Gc, crystallized intelligence. Recall that Gf, fl uid intelligence (intelligence-as-process), is already represented in the Figure 22 .2. It is the general computational power of the algorithmic on the distinction between rationalit y and intelligence OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF -FIRST-PROOF, 12/01/11, NEWGEN mind-importantly exemplifi ed by the ability to sustain cognitive decoupling. It is important to see how both of the major components of Gf/Gc theory miss critical aspects of rational thought. Fluid intelligence will, of course, have some relation to rationality because it indexes the computational power of the algorithmic mind to sustain decoupling. Because override and simulation are important operations for rational thought, Gf will defi nitely facilitate rational action in some situations. Nevertheless, the tendency to initiate override (arrow B in Fig. 22 .2) and to initiate simulation activities (arrow D in Fig. 22 .2) are both aspects of the refl ective mind unassessed by intelligence tests, so the tests will miss these components of rationality.
Th e situation with respect to Gc is a little diff erent. It is true that much of the mindware of rational thought would be classifi ed as crystallized intelligence in the abstract. But is it the kind of crystallized knowledge that is specifi cally assessed on the tests? Th e answer is no. Th e mindware of rational thought is somewhat specialized mindware (see Stanovich, 2009b) . It clusters in the domains of probabilistic reasoning (see Griffi ths et al., Chapter 3), causal reasoning (see Cheng & Buehner, Chapter 12), and scientifi c reasoning (see Dunbar & Klahr, Chapter 35) . In contrast, the crystallized knowledge assessed on IQ tests is deliberately designed to be nonspecialized. Th e designers of the tests, in order to make sure the sampling of Gc is fair and unbiased, explicitly attempt to broadly sample vocabulary, verbal comprehension domains, and general knowledge. Th e broad sampling ensures unbiasedness in the test, but it inevitably means that the specifi c knowledge bases critical to rationality will go unassessed. In short, Gc, as traditionally measured, does not assess individual diff erences in rationality, and Gf will do so only indirectly and to a mild extent. In short, as measures of rational thinking, IQ tests are radically incomplete.
Th e Requirements of Rational Th inking and Th eir Relation to Intelligence
Within the tripartite framework, rationality requires mental characteristics of three diff erent types. Problems in rational thinking arise when cognitive capacity is insuffi cient to sustain autonomous system override, when the necessity of override is not recognized, or when simulation processes do not have access to the mindware necessary for the synthesis of a better response. Th e source of these problems, and their relation to intelligence, help to explain one data trend that has been uncoveredthat some rational thinking problems show surprising degrees of dissociation from cognitive ability (Stanovich, 2009b (Stanovich, , 2011 Stanovich & West, 2007 , 2008a , 2008b West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008) . Myside bias, for example, is virtually independent of intelligence Sá, Kelley, Ho, & Stanovich, 2005; Stanovich & West, 2007 , 2008a , 2008b Toplak & Stanovich, 2003) . Individuals with higher IQs in a university sample are no less likely to process information from an egocentric perspective than are individuals with relatively lower IQs.
Irrational behavior can occur because the right mindware (cognitive rules, strategies, knowledge, and belief systems) is not available to use in decision making. We would expect to see a correlation with intelligence here because mindware gaps most often arise from lack of education or experience. Nevertheless, while it is true that more intelligent individuals learn more things than less intelligent individuals, much knowledge (and many thinking dispositions) relevant to rationality are picked up rather late in life. Explicit teaching of this mindware is not uniform in the school curriculum at any level. Th at such principles are taught very inconsistently means that some intelligent people may fail to learn these important aspects of critical thinking. In university samples, correlations with cognitive ability have been found to be roughly (in absolute magnitude) in the range of .20-.35 for probabilistic reasoning tasks and scientifi c reasoning tasks measuring a variety of rational principles (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff , 2007; Kokis et al., 2002; Parker & Fischhoff , 2005; Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 1998b , 1998c , 1998d , 2008b . Th is is again a magnitude of correlation that allows for substantial discrepancies between intelligence and rationality. Intelligence is thus no inoculation against many of the sources of irrational thought. None of these sources are directly assessed on intelligence tests, and the processes that are tapped by IQ tests are not highly overlapping with the processes and knowledge that explain variation in rational thinking ability.
Conclusions and Future Directions
Th e many studies of individual diff erences on heuristics and biases tasks falsify the most explicit versions of the Panglossian view. People are not all identically rational. Th ere are individual diff erences on all of these tasks and the individual diff erences are not the result of random performance errors (see Stanovich, 1999; Stein, 1996) . Instead, they are systematic. If there are such systematic individual diff erences, it means that at least some people, some of the time, are irrational. Extreme Panglossianism cannot be sustained. However, there is another position in the debate that, like Panglossianism, serves to minimize the attribution of irrationality. Termed the Apologist position (Stanovich, 1999) , this view takes very seriously the idea that humans have computational limitations that keep them from being fully rational.
Like the Meliorist, the Apologist accepts the empirical reality and nonspuriousness of normative/descriptive gaps, but the Apologist is much more hesitant to term them instances of irrationality. Th is is because the Apologist takes the position that to characterize a suboptimal behavior as irrational, it must be the case that the normative model is computable by the individual. If there are computational limitations aff ecting task performance, then the normative model may not be prescriptive, at least for individuals of low algorithmic capacity. Prescriptive models are usually viewed as specifying how processes of belief formation and decision making should be carried out, given the limitations of the human cognitive apparatus and the situational constraints (e.g., time pressure) with which the decision maker must deal (Baron, 2008) . From the Apologist's perspective, the descriptive model is quite close to the prescriptive model and the descriptive/normative gap is attributed to a computational limitation. Although the Apologist admits that performance is suboptimal from the standpoint of the normative model, it is not irrational because there is no prescriptive/descriptive gap.
However, as demonstrated in some of the data patterns I have described in this chapter, the Apologist stratagem will not work for all of the irrational tendencies that have been uncovered in the heuristics and biases literature. Th is is because many biases are not very strongly correlated with measures of intelligence (algorithmic capacity). Additionally, there is reliable variance in rational thinking found even after cognitive ability is controlled, and that reliable variance is associated with thinking dispositions in theoretically predictable ways. Th ese thinking dispositions refl ect control features of the refl ective mind that can lead to responses that are more or less rational. Th ey are one of the main sources of the individual diff erences in rational thought that I have been exploring in this chapter. Such thinking dispositions vary systematically from individual to individual, and they are the source of what Meliorists consider the variance in the irrationalities in human cognition. Unlike the Panglossian (who assumes uniform rationality) or the Apologist (who minimizes such variability while not entirely denying it), the Meliorist is very accepting of the idea of variability in rational thought.
Th e Panglossian position in the Great Rationality Debate has obscured the existence of individual diff erences in rational thought and its underlying components. In particular, Panglossian philosophers have obscured the importance of the refl ective mind. Philosophical treatments of rationality by Panglossians tend to have a common structure (see Cohen, 1981 , for example). Such treatments tend to stress the importance of the competence/performance distinction and then proceed to allocate all of the truly important psychological mechanisms to the competence side of the dichotomy.
For example, Rescher (1988) argues that "to construe the data of these interesting experimental studies [of probabilistic reasoning] to mean that people are systematically programmed to fallacious processes of reasoning-rather than merely that they are inclined to a variety of (occasionally questionable) substantive suppositions-is a very questionable step . . . . While all (normal) people are to be credited with the capacity to reason, they frequently do not exercise it well" (p. 196). Th ere are two parts to Rescher's (1988) point here: the "systematically programmed" part and the "inclination toward questionable suppositions" part (or, as Rips (1994, p. 394) puts it, whether incorrect reasoning is "systematically programmed or just a peccadillo"). Rescher's (1988) focus-like that of many who have dealt with the philosophical implications of the idea of human irrationality-is on the issue of how humans are "systematically programmed." "Inclinations toward questionable suppositions" are only of interest to those in the philosophical debates as mechanisms that allow one to drive a wedge between competence and performance-thus maintaining a theory of near-optimal human rational competence in the face of a host of responses that seemingly defy explanation in terms of standard normative models.
Analogously to Rescher, Cohen (1982) argues that there really are only two factors aff ecting performance on rational thinking tasks: "normatively on the distinction between rationalit y and intelligence OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF -FIRST-PROOF, 12/01/11, NEWGEN correct mechanisms on the one side, and adventitious causes of error on the other" (p. 252). Not surprisingly given such a conceptualization, the processes contributing to error ("adventitious causes") are of little interest to Cohen (1981 Cohen ( , 1982 . In his view, human performance arises from an intrinsic human competence that is impeccably rational, but responses occasionally deviate from normative correctness due to inattention, memory lapses, lack of motivation, and other fl uctuating but basically unimportant causes (in Cohen's view). Th ere is nothing in such a conception that would motivate any interest in patterns of errors or individual diff erences in such errors.
One of the goals of this chapter is to reverse the fi gure and ground in the rationality debate, which has tended to be dominated by the particular way that philosophers frame the competence/ performance distinction. From a psychological standpoint, there may be important implications in precisely the aspects of performance that have been backgrounded in this controversy ("adventitious causes," "peccadillos"). Th at is, whatever the outcome of the disputes about how humans are "systematically programmed," variation in the "inclination toward questionable suppositions" is of psychological interest as a topic of study in its own right. Th e research discussed in this chapter provides at least tentative indications that the "inclination toward questionable suppositions" has some degree of domain generality and that it is predicted by thinking dispositions that concern the epistemic and pragmatic goals of the individual and that are part of the refl ective mind. Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1993; see JohnsonLaird, 2006 ) articulate a view of rational thought that parses the competence/performance distinction much diff erently from that of Cohen (1981 Cohen ( , 1982 Cohen ( , 1986 . It is a view that highlights the importance of the refl ective mind and leaves room for individual diff erences in important components of cognition. At the heart of the rational competence that JohnsonLaird and Byrne (1993) attribute to humans is not perfect rationality but instead just one meta-principle: People are programmed to accept inferences as valid provided that they have constructed no mental model of the premises that contradict the inference (see Johnson-Laird, Chapter 9). Inferences are categorized as false when a mental model is discovered that is contradictory. However, the search for contradictory models is "not governed by any systematic or comprehensive principles" (p. 178).
Th e key point in Johnson-Laird and Byrne's (1993) account is that once an individual constructs a mental model from the premises, once the individual draws a new conclusion from the model, and once the individual begins the search for an alternative model of the premises that contradicts the conclusion, the individual "lacks any systematic method to make this search for counter-examples" (p. 205). Here is where Johnson-Laird and Byrne's (1993) model could be modifi ed to allow for the infl uence of thinking styles in ways that the impeccable competence view of Cohen (1981) does not. In this passage, Johnson-Laird and Byrne seem to be arguing that there are no systematic control features of the search process. But epistemically related thinking dispositions may in fact be refl ecting just such control features.
Individual diff erences in the extensiveness of the search for contradictory models could arise from a variety of cognitive factors that, although they may not be completely systematic, may be far from "adventitious"-factors such as dispositions toward premature closure, cognitive confi dence, refl ectivity, dispositions toward confi rmation bias, and ideational generativity. Th e decontextualizing requirement of many heuristics and biases tasks is a feature that is emphasized by many critics of that literature who, nevertheless, fail to see it as implying a research program for diff erential psychology. For example, I have argued that to contextualize a problem is such a ubiquitous reasoning style for human beings that it constitutes one of a very few so-called fundamental computational biases of information processing (Stanovich, 2003 (Stanovich, , 2004 . Th us, it is not surprising that many people respond incorrectly when attempting a psychological task that is explicitly designed to require a decontextualized reasoning style (contrary-to-fact syllogisms, argument evaluation, etc.). But recall the empirically demonstrated variability on all of these tasks. Th e fact that some people do give the decontextualized response means that at least some people have available a larger repertoire of reasoning styles, allowing them to reason fl exibly reason so as to override fundamental computational biases if the situation requires.
Another way of stressing the importance of individual diff erences in understanding the nature of rational thought is in terms of Dennett's (1987) so-called intentional stance, which he marries to an assumption of idealized rationality. Dennett (1988) argues that we use the intentional stance for humans and dogs but not for lecterns because for the latter "there is no predictive leverage gained by adopting the intentional stance" (p. 496). However, in several experiments discussed in this chapter, it has been shown that there is additional predictive leverage to be gained by relaxing the idealized rationality assumption of Dennett's (1987 Dennett's ( , 1988 intentional stance and by positing measurable and systematic variation in intentional-level psychologies (that is, in the refl ective mind). Knowledge about such individual diff erences in people's intentional-level psychologies can be used to predict variance in the normative/descriptive gap displayed on many reasoning tasks. Consistent with the Meliorist conclusion that there can be individual diff erences in human rationality, the results show that there is variability in reasoning that cannot be accommodated within a model of perfect rational competence operating in the presence of performance errors and computational limitations.
Notes
1. It should also be noted that in the view of rationality taken in this chapter, rationality is an intentional-level personal entity and not an algorithmic-level subpersonal one (Bermudez, 2001; Davies, 2000; Frankish, 2009; Stanovich, 1999 Stanovich, , 2009a . A memory system in the human brain is not rational or irrational-it is merely effi cient or ineffi cient (or of high or low capacity). Th us, subprocesses of the brain do not display rational or irrational properties per se, although they may contribute in one way or another to personal decisions or beliefs that could be characterized as such. Rationality concerns the actions of an entity in its environment that serve its goals. One of course could extrapolate the notion of environment to include the interior of the brain itself and then talk of a submodule that chose strategies rationally or not. Th is move creates two problems. First, what are the goals of this subpersonal entity-what are its interests that its rationality is trying to serve? Th is is unclear in the case of a subpersonal entity. Second, such a move regresses all the way down. We would need to talk of a neuron fi ring being either rational or irrational. As Oaksford and Chater (1998) put it, "the fact that a model is optimizing something does not mean that the model is a rational model. Optimality is not the same as rationality . . . .Stomachs may be well or poorly adapted to their function (digestion), but they have no beliefs, desires or knowledge, and hence the question of their rationality does not arise" (pp. 4 and 5).
2. Th e principle of maximizing expected value says that the action that a rational person should choose is the one with the highest expected value. Expected value is calculated by taking the objective value of each outcome and multiplying it by the probability of that outcome and then summing those products over all of the possible outcomes. Symbolically, the formula is as follows: Expected value = ∑ p i v i ; where p i is the probability of each outcome and v i is the value of each outcome. Th e symbol ∑ is the summation sign, and simply means "add up all of the terms that follow." Th e term utility refers to subjective value. Th us, the calculation of expected utility involves identical mathematics except that a subjective estimate of utility is substituted for the measure of objective value.
3. It is important to note that the Meliorist recognizes two diff erent ways in which human decision-making performance might be improved. Th ese might be termed cognitive change and environmental change. First, it might be possible to teach people better reasoning strategies and to have them learn rules of decision making that are helpful (see Stanovich, 2009b) . Th ese would represent instances of cognitive change. Additionally, however, research has shown that it is possible to change the environment so that natural human reasoning strategies will not lead to error (Gigerenzer, 2002; Milkman, Chugh, & Bazerman, 2009; Th aler & Sunstein, 2008) . For example, choosing the right default values for a decision would be an example of an environmental change. In short, environmental alterations (as well as cognitive changes) can prevent rational thinking problems. Th us, in cases where teaching people the correct reasoning strategies might be diffi cult, it may well be easier to change the environment so that decision-making errors are less likely to occur.
4. Such empirical studies indicate that cognitive capacity and thinking dispositions measures are tapping separable variance. Th e converging evidence on the existence of this separable variance is growing (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff , 2007; Finucane & Gullion, 2010; Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997; Klaczynski & Lavallee, 2005; Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000; Kokis et al., 2002; Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, & Farrelly, 2004; Parker & Fischhoff , 2005; Sá & Stanovich, 2001; Stanovich & West, 1997 , 1998c Toplak, Liu, Macpherson, Toneatto, & Stanovich, 2007; .
